Rio de
Janeiro. nopolies, prohibitions, and heavy taxes, the,]whole revenue
from the Brazils, wa:|: not said to be equal to a
million sterling, of which th#expences»*of their government
consume about a third. The taxes were .severely
felt, particularly in the interior provinces, where the
carriage and transit duties increased the price of every
article so enormously, that-a:sbottle of port wine, for
distance, cost tep shillingÿeterling to the consumer.
The rising spirit of thèöpeople, little patient óf the
hardships imposed upon them by the mother country1,
led, not long since, to a conspiracy at Minas Geraes, remarkable,
and indeed formidable, as some of the principal
officers of the government there* both laity and
clergy, entered into it. It appears that the troops sent
from Portugal were seldom afterwards called home. The
civil officers, except the viceroy, were allowed also to
be stationary. These persons, tho natives generally pf
Portugal, soon changed their original affection for the
mother country into an attachment to that, where
they were likély to spend their days;; and were some-
times tempted to sacrifice to their own, the interest
of their employers. Their views, ón the present occasion,
were discovered in time to prevent thé intended
fatal consequences ; but it was found necessary
to march a considerable number of troops* from the
coast, into the back country, to maintain tranquillity:
good policy, as well as clemency, confined capital punii^
npipnt ' to one o§Jfy of|the Conspirator^ < The rest were
banished to the Portuguese settlements on the coast of £
Africa.
Whatever difficulties the Portuguese may be likely
to encounter in souring their American possession^
against internal enemies, they seemed to have taken rtd
mean precautions against any foreign attack. With regard
to Rio, Captain Parish remarks, that “ Portugal,
| from the relatively low state of its military and marine
“ establishments, might; find it impracticable tor, convey
“ succour to that distant colony, after being once engaged4
‘‘ in a waar with atpyfiEuropean power; and must, ihere-
fibre, provide for tits defeaasce independently of any
| i hope of further, assistance. The best constructed fbr-
“ tifications would, perhaps,, be insufficieni; to answer
“ such a purpose, for tho amply garrisoned and sup-
“ plied-, it cpuld not he expected to hold out many
i H | against a well conducted siege, undertaken
“ with an adequate force. It is perbaips ©n this account
“ that the Portugueze have not erected here any very
“ considerable work. The defences ©f the place consist
“ in several small forts and batteries, detached lean each
“ .other,, but so disposed as to throw every'impediment
‘ ‘ in the way of an enemy, ©m his entering the harbour,
“ and on his subsequent attempts ffiponi the shoxe. Should
“ he, however, succeed in both, the' military establish-
“ ment. of (the country is such as sto> enable- it, with a
Rio de
Janeiro.