“ Then, if notice is given to me in proper time, I would still be willing
to submit a plan by which the United States government may attain its
purposes.”
With reference to this letter, in the pamphlet before us M. Yon Siebold
states that by means of his “ correspondent on board the Mississippi ” he
did not fail “ to advise Commodore Perry to follow a peaceful plan, which
.counsel seems to have borne good fruit.”
I t is very remarkable how strikingly facts in the history of our negotiation
have contradicted the confident predictions of this gentleman, who professed
such “ profound knowledge and long experience of Japanese affairs.”
The Dutch, he states, were the only people who could establish a commercial
treaty with Japan, and they had undertaken to sustain our effort. The
facts are, that they were not able to make a treaty for themselves until
long after ours was consummated; that their support of our efforts consisted,
as we have shown, in the attempt to make a treaty for themselves before
our arrival, committing the Japanese to agree to no treaty with any foreign
power but such as they prescribed; and that from the arrival to the departure
of our ships, in no mode, either directly or indirectly, did they have any
communication with the Dutch, nor was the aid of the latter either invoked
or employed in the slightest degree in the negotiation of our treaty.
M. Yon Siebold predicted that our overtures would be declined, or that
a final answer would be delayed as long as possible. The fa c ts are, that our
overtures were not declined, and that, under the circumstances of the death
of the Emperor and other events, the delay was not unreasonably long.
The squadron returned to Yedo bay on the 13th of February, and all the
terms of the treaty were substantially agreed on by the 23d of March, and it
was formally signed on the 31st of that month. So that about six weeks
elapsed from the commencement of the negotiation to its close in a treaty.
M. Yon Siebold predicted that various pretexts would be resorted to by
the Japanese to protract the negotiation. Singularly enough, the fa c t is,
that of the six anticipated objections specified by Yon Siebold, not one was
urged in the negotiation as insurmountable, and five were not mentioned at
all. The only one named was the unalterable nature of the Japanese laws.
And as to the complacency with which M. Yon Siebold congratulates
himself on the “ good fruit ” resulting from his counsel, we have only to remark
that we are very sorry his good advice did not arrive in time to afford
the Commodore any aid, inasmuch as his course had been fully decided on,
and in part followed without the slightest reference to it. In fact, Commodore
Perry never saw M. Von Siebold1 s letter at all.
Of the disposition to disparage the United States and its expedition to
Japan, the proofs are quite as unequivocal as those we have given above
of self-conceit and arrogance. Our country is more than once brought into
disadvantageous comparison with Russia; is accused of being influenced by
the most selfish motives; of seeking her own advantage without the slightest
regard to that of Japan or of the rest of the civilized world; and in this
respect her conduct is contrasted with that of Holland, which is affirmed to
have been always prompted by a most liberal desire to open Japan to the
oommerce of the world. Russia, also, is said to be benevolently pursuing
the same end, and also to be seeking the free exercise of Christian worship
for all Russian subjects in Japan. With Russia’s zeal for the protection of
Christians in Japan we have nothing to do; we may remark, however, it is a
little curious that Russia should not be warned to avoid the subject of Christianity
in Japan, while Commodore Perry is so decidedly advised by M. Von
Siebold, carefully to proclaim that he is-no Christian missionary; and is informed
that the dread of the introduction of Christianity is the only real obstacle
to his success. '
The chief magistrate of our country is also rebuked for a want of the usual
diplomatic form, and of the dignified tone, so necessary to be used toward
the sovereign of a country so much accustomed to etiquette.
Piqued at Commodore Perry’s success in the bay of Vedo, when M.
Von Siebold had predicted that he would be obliged to go to Nagasaki, and
that his proposals would not be listened to anywhere else, if, indeed, they
would be listened to at all, he sneeringly attributes his success to what he
imputes as a fault, viz : that Commodore Perry informed the Japanese that
the mere request to go to Nagasaki would, if repeated, be construed into an
insult to the United States. And, finally, though we have succeeded, it is to
be of but little value to us, inasmuch as Russia and the Netherlands can better
supply Japan’s wants than we can, and their political and commercial
regulations are Buch as the Siogoon can sympathize with, while ours are
not.
Of the selfishness of our motives we readily admit tbat we sought commercial
intercourse with Japan, because we supposed it would be advantageous.
Such, we believe, is the motive of all intelligent nations in establishing
friendly relations with others. We can only smile at the simplicity
of those who expect to deceive the world by professions of pure, disinterested
friendship from one nation toward another, irrespective of all considerations
of national benefit. We think that every nation which has sought intercourse
with Japan has supposed that such intercourse would prove advantageous
to the seeker ; nor are we aware that there is anything very criminal or selfish
in the desire that advantage may result from the communication. But
it is quite possible to believe that benefit to both nations may result from
the intercourse we would establish, and such benefit may be honestly desired,
even while we seek our own interest. This is not selfishness. But further,
we beg distinctly to state the fact that Commodore Perry did express to the
J apanese commissioners the desire that other nations might have the benefits
of our treaty, or of one similar to it, and received for reply that there were