These documents were all prepared and placed in the hands of the Dutch
officials as soon as possible after the government of the Netherlands became
certain that an expedition would sail from the United States, and some
months before Commodore Perry left our shores.
In anticipation of the contemplated enterprise, the government of the
United States, in July, 1852, (at which time the Dutch draft of a treaty had
been sent out on its way to Dezima,) applied respectfully to the government
of the Netherlands, announcing officially that the American squadron would
be sent, that its visit was meant to be friendly, and that its object was, if
possible, to obtain from Japan some mitigation of her system of exclusion ,*
it asked, also, that instructions might be given to the Dezima chief to afford,
if it should be desired by us, his official co-operation in furthering the accomplishment
of our object. This request was answered by a promise that such
instructions should be given; and, by request, copies were furnished to the
United States of the letter of William II , of 1844, and of the Emperor’s
answer to it of 1845 ; but of the draft of a Dutch treaty then on its way to
Japan, or of any accompanying instructions to the Dutch officials in the east,
the United States, of course, heard and knew nothing.
Thus affairs stood when our squadron sailed on the 24th of November,
1852. Long before it arrived in the Japanese waters, the Dutch chief a t
Dezima had been endeavoring to carry out his instructions, and negotiate
with the Japanese the treaty o f which the draft had been sent to him.
But the authorities of Japan persisted in their refusal to appoint a person of
consideration as their confidential agent to negotiate any treaty at all. In
this state of affairs, the Dezima chief, I rightly resolving not to sacrifice the
business to a mere matter of form,” as the Dutch document expresses it, at
once addressed the governor of Nagasaki, and attempted to open a negotiation
with him. He laid before him the several items in the draft of the
treaty with which he had been furnished, accompanying them with explanations,
and set forth what he deemed the principles which were for the
Japanese interest, and which should predominate in the negotiations which
he thought might result from the anticipated propositions of the United
States ; for both he and the Japanese knew that our squadron was on its
way. He concluded his letter as follows: “ His Majesty, the King of the
Netherlands, expects that the peace of the Japanese Empire can be preserved,
if the government of Japan will answer the propositions of the
United States in the manner indicated; ” that is, on the bases set forth
in the Dutch draft of a treaty. But the Japanese treated this attempt
as they had all the previous ones from the Dezima chief; and its only
effect was to quicken their native shrewdness, and prompt to more numerous
demands for explanations, and more thorough investigations into the
subject.
At length, in June, 1858, the American squadron, purposely avoiding
Nagasaki, made its appearance in the bay of Yedo, and thus was in Japan
before the Dutch were able to anticipate the American commissioner in
making a treaty. The American squadron never was at Nagasaki, and our
representative never had the least communication with the Dutch chief at
Dezima.
The Bussian squadron soon after entered the port of Nagasaki, and the
result of that visit has already been stated. Russia made no treaty with
Japan.
Commodore Perry signed the treaty with Japan on the last day of March,
1854; and the Dutch government dispatched their war steamer Soembing
from Batavia for Japan on the 25th of July, 1854. This was deemed a
measure of expediency, as the sight of the American and Bussian steamers
had excited the liveliest interest in the Japanese. The Soembing, during
her stay, was visited by men of the highest rant, and, in fact, was made a
school of instruction for a large number of Japanese. Finally, the English
squadron, under Admiral Stirling, came in on the 7th of September, 1854,
and deepened the impression which had been made in Japan by the spectacle
of so many armed ships of different nations.
The document before us concludes by claiming great merit for the Dutch,
in having opened Japan to the world. I t thus speaks ■ The Netherlands
have understood their mission, when, in consequence of the course of events,
they placed themselves at the head to operate, in the interest of all, a mitigation
in the system of exclusion that existed relative to foreign nations in
Japan. The letter of his Majesty, the late William II , is thereof an irrefragable
proof.” “ The United States of North Amerioa have obtained, by
treaty, the opening to their flag of two ports in the Japanese Empire; and
one other power seems to have succeeded in a similar manner. In the face
of such results, we cannot deny or undervalue the impression and effect produced
by the presence of powerful fleets, or the influence exerted by the
simultaneous and serious attempts of different nations. But we wish to see
acknowledged the part that the Netherlands had in it by their advice and
persuasion. Indeed, these fleets realized the predictions of your Majesty’s
royal father, and served to procure a more ready aceeptanee of his disinterested
advice. The draft of a treaty of 1852—the letter of the chief at
Dezima of the 2d of November, 1852—the communication of the Governor
of Nagasaki of the 9th of November, 1853—finally, the comparing of the
said draft of a treaty with the convention concluded by the United States—
all this presents the undeniable fact, that the measures taken, in consequence
of your Majesty’s orders, have powerfully contributed to the results obtained
by other nations.
“ In fact, the Netherlands have always desired an opening of Japanese
ports, in the general interest, and in favor of commerce. Attached disinterestedly
to that policy, the Netherlands have sought no privileges for them