O f E * B 5 ? 0f Uraga ‘ 0 — N * - grade
The Japanese, however, were always on the alert to gain a point in di-
L r V t th61r C°nVivial freed°m did duties. Captain Buchanan had informed Tatznoske Eo0f t tfhoer «inett etnhtieoinr oofff itchiael
t l i T r \ Yed° Bay DeXt * * that shrewd gen
tioT to T S °f Champagne’ and sh0™ § his usual eager atfention
t0 business, even m the midst of pleasure, asked the caplfin for a
t T 1 “ he had said in words about the squadron’s
departure. This was refused with an expression of cold reserve on the part
Captain Buchanan, as it would seem to imply a doubt of his word
• Y teJ aPT 6 °®Cmls nOW PrePared t0 deP“ t, and finally, after express-
rng m the most courteous terms their thanks for the treatment they had receded,
and heir regret on leaving their American friends, shook all the
officers warmly by the hand, and went bowing and smiling over the side of
Y e z ? I J I )°at' S0°Mr W6re they seated on their mats, than
Yezaimen showed his appreciation of the present of wine by ordering one
the cases to be immediately opened, and taking the first bottle that came
impatiently knocked off its neck, and without more ado commenced imbibing
health1In ’ V 7 y d7 iring’ WUh US USUal ooortOBJ, to drink a parting
health to his American friends. His boat soon pulled out of sight behind
the projecting promontory of Uraga, and nothing more was seen of the
tX w o 8 “ “ d his WOrt},y and Earned associates Tatznoske and
The survey of the west side of the magnificent bay having been completed
from Uraga to a point about fourteen miles below Yedo, and the
steamer Mississippi having ascended with the boats and sounded six miles
nearer to that capital, the Commodore believed that a sufficient knowledge
was obtained of the navigation of the bay to conduct the man-of-war, the
ermont, which was to join his squadron on his next visit, to the American
anchorage, or even higher if necessary.
The governor of Uraga, as will have been observed, had evinced a great
anxiety, during the several conferences on board the Susquehanna, to learn
how long the Commodore intended to remain on the coast. On these occasions
Yezaimen always took care to remark that it was the custom of the
Japanese government to be very slow in deciding upon matters having reference
to foreign countries. In consequence of these representations, and
knowing that the propositions contained in the President’s letter were of
such^importance as to require time for deliberation, overturning, as they
would, if acceded to, many of the fundamental laws of the Empire the
Commodore deemed it advisable not to wait for a reply. To these ’were
added other reasons of importance. The Commodore had not provisions or
water sufficient to allow of his remaining on the coast more than a month
longer, and he well knew that the Japanese authorities could easily, and
with every apparent show of reason, defer any satisfactory reply to a period
beyond the time when it would be absolutely necessary for him to leave.
They would be prepared, as an excuse for delay, to allege the necessity of
calling together and conferring with the princes of the Empire, as also of
consulting the Dairi or Ecclesiastical Emperor, and thus the Commodore
might be put off from day to day, and ultimately be obliged to sail without
any satisfaction whatever. Such a result would have been construed into a
triumph by the Japanese, and would have caused, as the Commodore believed,
a serious injury to the success of his mission.
The Commodore, moreover, was glad to have a good excuse for waiting
until the ensuing spring for the final answer from the Japanese government,
because he knew that some of his ships were required to protect American
interests on the coast of China, then somewhat endangered in consequence
of the disturbed state of that country. He could not spare any of the
squadron while he remained in Japan, for the vessels promised by the Navy
Department had not yet followed him as he had expected. He was also unprepared
to respond with becoming courtesy to any concession or act of friendliness
on the part of the Japanese government, in consequence of not having
received the presents from the United States that were expected in the
Vermont, and which it was essential to have ready upon the reception of
a favorable answer to the President’s letter.
The Commodore preferred, then, to wait until the ensuing spring, when
he would be able to concentrate his whole force, and be prepared with store
and coal vessels, and all other conveniences for remaining an indefinite time
to secure whatever concessions the Japanese should be disposed to make.
His policy, though in conformity with the exigencies of his position, was at
the same time a courteous concession to the deliberate ceremoniousness of
Japanese diplomacy, and was crowned by the happiest result. A letter signifying
his intention to leave immediately and return the ensuing spring for
an answer to the President’s letter, had been, it will be recollected, delivered
with that letter on the occasion of the Commodore’s reception on shore.
The squadron left the anchorage in Susquehanna Bay on Sunday morn-
iug> (July 17.) With the steamer Susquehanna towing the Saratoga, and
the Mississippi the Plymouth, the four vessels began their voyage and started
away rapidly without a yard of canvas set. The morning was fine, and
as the departure of the Americans was a great event, and the appearance
of the four ships moving off in stately procession, succeeding each other in
regular line, was imposing and novel to the Japanese unfamiliar with the
power of steam, crowds of people gathered upon the land to behold the
sight. As the promontory of j Uraga was doubled the soldiers thronged out
of the batteries, and hurrying to the loftiest summits eagerly looked at the
passing ships. The course of the squadron was down the centre of the bay,