emment was announced to the world some twelve months before the time of
its leaving, and had formed the subject of comment in more than one country
of Europe. The general opinion abroad was that the mission would, like the
many others that had been attempted by various powers, prove fruitless.
Dr. Yon Siebold, in particular, whose long residence in Japan was supposed
to give great importance to his opinions, thus wrote to a friend concerning
it : “ My mind accompanies the expedition. That it will be successM by
peaceful means I doubt very much. I f I could only inspire Commodore
Perry, he would triumph,’’ &o. The progress of the expedition was, of
course, watched by foreign powers with great interest.
Commodore Perry cast anchor in the bay of Yedo, the commercial capital
of Japan, on the 8th of July, 1853. On the 22d of August, 1853, a
Russian squadron, under the command of Admiral Pontiatine, anchored in the
bay of Nagasaki. We know not precisely of what vessels this expedition
was composed; but we believe that, beside the frigate PaUas and the
steamer Vostoch, the Aurora, of 48 guns, and the corvette Navarino, of 22,
were sent, the one to the Pacific, and the other ostensibly to Kamtschatka,
while it is quite certain that not long after a Russian squadron of several
vessels-of-war was at Copenhagen, the officers of which said that they were
destined to remain five years in the waters of the Japanese archipelago. An
unusually large Russian naval force was therefore collected in the Pacific,
and in the vicinity of Japan, to be there on the expected visit of Commodore
Perry. There were not wanting those who suspected that Russia was
silently pursuing her own system of policy. I f Commodore Perry unfortunately
should fail in his peaceful attempts, and be brought into hostile collision
with the Japanese, Russia was on the spot, not to mediate, but to
tender to Japan her aid as an ally in the conflict, and if successful, to avail
herself of the moment of confidence quietly to get a foothold in some part of
the Kingdom, with the intention, at the proper time, of absorbing all. There
is no power in the other hemisphere to which thé possession of Japan, or the
control of its affairs, is as important as it is to Russia. She is on one side of
the islands, the United States on the other. The Pacific ocean is destined to
be the theatre of immense commercial undertakings. Russia is, in a great
degree, shut out by her local position from easy access to the Atlantic ; but
with such harbors on the Pacific as Japan would give her, she might hope to
become the controlling maritime power of the world. Our friendly relations
and influence with the Japanese, therefore, might interfere materially with
the ulterior plans of Russia. Hence she was first in the field to watch all
our movements. Thus, we say, some interpreted her conduct. We do not
mean to assert that they interpreted it correctly, or that such was the policy
Russia had resolved on. But the fa c t is, as we have stated, that simultaneously
with our expedition she did largely increase her naval armament in the
waters of Japan. Commodore Perry was at some loss to understand precisely
the policy of Russia. In a letter of November 12th, 1853, the Russian
admiral made a distinct proposition of joining his forces to, and entering
into full co-operation with, the American squadron. This may have been
prompted by an expectation of our success and a doubt of his own. At any
rate, the Commodore civilly, but decidedly, declined the proposal, and, in a
letter to the Secretary of the Navy, assigned most satisfactory reasons for so
doing. He stated that it was § inconsistent with our policy of abstaining
from all alliances with foreign powers; and for the reason, also, that his cooperation
cannot advance the interest of the United States, however it might
benefit the objects of the Russian Emperor, of the nature of whose designs I
(says the Commodore) am utterly ignorant.” But whatever were her secret
purposes to promote her own, or throw obstacles in the way of our success,
if she had any, one thing is certain, fo r that success we are not indebted in
the slightest degree to Russia, by any direct act o f hers to that end. Indirectly,
however, she may have furthered the object. We are in possession
of very recent information from Japan, tending to show that the imperial
government seems to be distrustful of the purposes of Russia. The movements
of that nation on the Amoor river have been viewed with so much apprehension,
that the Emperor some time ago dispatched a special agent to
discover, if possible, their ulterior purposes. The Japanese have resolved
that they will raise an efficient army, and equip a navy, not composed of
junks, but of vessels built after the European model. The restrictions on
ship-building have been removed, and already, since our treaty was signed,
one vessel for commercial purposes has been built and rigged like ours. The
Japanese have heard, too, of the war in which Russia is at present engaged.
The information produced intense excitement, and it was resolved by the imperial
council that treaties similar to that made with the United States should
be made with all nations seeking them. This opens Japan to the trade of
the world. They knew, too, that the British Admiral Stirling was seeking
the Russian vessels in the neighborhood of Japan, and they were hence the
more willing to make treaties with all, as the means of securing Japan from
aggression by any, and of enabling her to preserve, as she wishes, a strict neutrality.
The visit of Russia, however, led to no treaty. The squadron left Nagasaki
on the 23d of November, 1853, and returned to it early in 1854. It
left again, after several fruitless interviews with the Japanese authorities,
on the 5th of February, and was absent until the 20th of April, when it
reappeared at Nagasaki, but it remained until the 26th only, when it took
its final departure.
But other foreign powers have contributed as little to the success of our
negotiations as Russia has. On the 7th of September, 1854, Admiral Stir-
ling, in command of the English squadron, arrived at Nagasaki, one purpose
of his visit being to make a treaty, in which he succeeded. But the English