never pretended that they facilitated our negotiations; they may possibly
have indirectly derived some benefit from our success; but we will not
undertake to assert that they did. We think that they are more indebted
to the Japanese apprehension of Russia’s designs, and to the fact of the war
in which she is now engaged, than to anything else. We may, indeed, by
having induced the first departure from the long established rule to exclude
all foreigners but the Dutch and Chinese, have made it more easy to commence
negotiation, but our aid goes not beyond this accidental assistance.
Of the precise terms of the English treaty it is not here necessary to speak.
One of the officers of Admiral Stirling thus speaks of it in a public communication
through the English newspapers: “ The treaty now made with
Japan contains nothing about commerce, yet it opens the way and prepares
for future negotiation on this important point.” “ I t is highly probable that
what has been done by Sir James Stirling at Nagasaki may exceed in durability
and value the work done at Tedo by the Americans, although that
cost a special mission, and was heralded to the world with a very loud flourish
of trumpets indeed.”
To this pert outbreak of transparent envy, we have only to say we earnestly
hope that when a treaty is made which does say something “ about
commerce,” it may prove both durable and valuable to England; and to
add, that we should be sorry to think such flippant impertinence as is here
exhibited is a common characteristic of British naval officers. From the
brave we look for “ high thoughts seated in a heart of courtesy.”
But the Dutch have claimed, and that by an official document, that
they, in effect, did most of our work for us. I t is strange that a nation of
which all Christendom has, for more than two hundred years, supposed that
it has sought uniformly to secure to itself a monopoly in the trade of
Japan, should venture, when their monopoly is destroyed, to stand forth and
say, in substance, that they always lamented its existence and labored for
its demolition Has Christendom been so long deceived? We fear the
world will ask embarrassing questions. I t will say : “ Did not the Dutch
do what they could to drive out the Portuguese ? Did they not assist
in the bombardment at Simabara, and contribute to the extirpation of the
native Christians, who were supposed to sympathize with the Portuguese ?
Did they not manifest hostility toward their Protestant neighbors of the
English factory at Firando, established by Saris and conducted by Coekes,
until the English left ? When, in the reign of Charles II., the English
sought to renew the trade with Japan, was it not the Dutch who hastened
to inform the imperial government that the wife of Charles was the daughter
of the King of Portugal, thus arraying the deep-seated and ancient Japanese
hatred of the Portuguese against the English ? When the ‘ Phaeton,’ under
Pellew, visited Nagasaki, in 1808, was it not M. Doeff, the Dutch chief at
Dezima, who devised and counselled the plan whereby the English were to
have been murdered to a man ? When Java was in possession of the English,
and Holland, for a time, had been blotted from the list of nations, was
it not the same M. Doeff, who, to the craft of the trader, added the cunning
of the diplomatist, and, by treachery to the Japanese in the bribery of their
officials, contrived, at one and the same time, to pay the debts of Dezima
and enrich himself personally, out of the two expeditions sent by Sir Stamford
Raffles ? ”
And now, when the United States have, without seeing a Dutchman, or
using a Dutch document, successfully negotiated a treaty, Holland stands
forth, and by a formal official report from her minister of colonies, declares
that she will now “ perform the agreeable task of showing the persevering
and disinterested efforts which the Dutch government has made” to cause
Japan to open her ports to the commerce of the United States. A brief
notice of this extraordinary document is called for by a regard to the truth
of history.
The statement of the Dutch “ minister of colonies,” when condensed, is
substantially this: That in the year 1844, about the time of Commodore
Biddle’s visit to Japan, the then King of Holland, William II , wrote-a letter
to the Emperor of Japan, in which attention was called to the introduction
of steam in navigation, the consequent increased development of commerce
in the Japanese seas, and the danger likely to result to J apan from
her rigid system of excluding foreigners from the Kingdom. I t recommended
friendly and commercial relations as the surest means of avoiding
collisions; and finally, from a grateful sense of the long-continued favor
shown to the Dutch by the Japanese, it tendered to the latter the C£ disinterested
counsel to relax the laws against foreigners,” and offered to send an
envoy to give fuller explanations to J apan of what she should do, provided
the Emperor desired it. . This letter, the Dutch document states, contains
the principles which have formed the basis of all Holland’s subsequent
action, so far as other powers are concerned.
In 1845, the Emperor caused an answer to be sent to the letter, in which
it was politely, but very decidedly, announced, that Japan had no wish to
alter her ancient laws with respect to foreigners.
With this the Dutch remained content; and, so far from pressing the
subject in any way, in 1846 they became the medium of announcing to the
civilized world an edict of Japan, forbidding foreigners to make charts and
drawings of the Japanese waters and coasts, and forbidding shipwrecked
Japanese sailors to return to their country in any ships but those o f the
Netherlands and China.
Presently, when, in 1852, it became certain that an expedition was to be
sent from the United States, under Commodore Perry, the Dutch.forthwith
sent out orders to their governor general in the Indies to address the governor
of Nagasaki, requesting that he would appoint a confidential agent to
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