selves in Japan; but they have, in equity, desired and obtained treatment
similar to that of others, when to these favors were granted.”
These are the facts as set forth by the Dutch, and this the extent of their
claims; nor would we in the slightest degree detract from what may be justly
their due. We confess, however, that, to us the importance as well as effects
of Dutch co-operation in our treaty seem to be somewhat exaggerated. I t
sometimes happens that men and nations cannot work to the production of
their own particular ends without thereby contributing, whether they wish it
or not, to the accomplishment of similar ends sought by others. The success,
however, of others, which they never sought, and which is but an accident
resulting from their efforts to another end, can scarcely be claimed as a
ground of merit, or demand very loud acknowledgments from those who may
have been thus casually benefited. The basis of a claim, quantum meruit,
is some benefit purposely done by one to another, or some loss purposely
sustained for his advantage. We readily concede that the Dezima chief,
with the draft of the Dutch treaty in his possession, strove faithfully and
judiciously, as became him, to induce the Japanese authorities to accede to
the terms of that treaty and sign it, before our ambassador could reach
Japan. Of this we have no right to complain. We concede also that his
proceedings brought to the knowledge of the Japanese what the nature of a
commercial treaty was, and furnished them also with some valuable hints as
to some of its provisions, which afforded them topics of reflection and investigation,
and prepared them for the consideration of our treaty when it should
be proposed; but it will scarcely be pretended that the Dutch action was
prompted by the direct design of aiding the United States; and still less,
that it induced the Japanese government to depart from its long established
policy of exclusion. The Dutch were themselves endeavoring to negotiate
a treaty; and such a departure must be pre-supposed before it was expedient
to present the terms of a treaty at all.
But further, as to this point of departing from their settled policy, it is
on the record, that the letter of the King of Holland himself on this very
subject, written in 1844, was answered by the Japanese government in 1845,
with a most explicit declaration that they would not abandon their ancient
policy and usage. At this time then (1845) the Dutch seem to have accomplished
nothing; and it is not on the record that they ever renewed their
effort from this time forward until 1852, when they knew the American expedition
would certainty be sent; and the mode of renewal was to offer to
Japan a treaty which they had prepared to suit themselves, and which was
fo r their own benefit. For it will be remembered that by that treaty no
foreign nation was to be allowed by treaty to trade with Japan, but on certain
bases, laid down in the 4th article of the Dutch draft. Now suppose
Japan had signed the treaty proposed to her by Holland, what would have
necessarily resulted ? The following consequences, viz :
1. That the Dutch should alone dictate what kind of treaties all other
foreign nations might make with Japan.
2. That Japan, an independent power, should preclude herself from the
right of making any treaty but such as Holland should approve.
3. That as Holland was to be placed on the footing of the most favored
nations in any treaty Japan might make, the Dutch, in addition to the privileges
they already possessed in Japan, and in addition to any others they
might obtain by future negotiation, should have also every privilege of every
kind that any nation might chance to get by treaty.
Had the Dezima chief succeeded in negotiating his treaty before Commodore
Perry’s arrival, would it have benefited the United States ?
But this is not all. We are constrained, from public documents of the
Dutch themselves, to believe that they never cordially furthered our efforts
to effect a treaty which should open Japan. In a letter from the Dutch
governor general of the Indies, written from Java on the 22d September,
1852, addressed to Commodore Perry, (then on his way to Japan,) the commodore
is informed that a dispatch for the Dezima chief is enclosed, which
the commodore may transmit to him, in case he wishes his co-operation.
Now, at this very time, the governor general well knew that the Dezima
chief had the draft of a treaty, and instructions to have it ratified if possible;
and every effort was being made to have it thus ratified before Commodore
Perry could arrive. Had it been thus ratified, we have seen above what
sort of co-operation the Dezima chief would have rendered; it would have
been to allow Japan to negotiate just such a treaty as Holland had seen fit
to make for her and for us. But further still—the last clause of the
governor general’s letter to Commodore Perry is suggestive of a fact pregnant
with evidence as to the cordiality with which Holland seconded our
efforts. “ I beg to remark, in view of the object at present contemplated by
both our governments, that in case the Netherlands chief of the factory at
Dezima should have succeeded in opening negotiations with the government
of Japan, it is not unlikely that any proof of co-operation between America
and Holland would prejudice these negotiations, as you are aware that the
American expedition to Japan has not always been represented to be o f a
wholly friendly and peaceful character.” Of course, these latter words, to
have any meaning, must imply that the Japanese had doubts of the friendly
nature of our visit. Now, who told the Japanese that it was unfriendly?
The Dutch were the only Europeans with whom they had any intercourse,
or from whom they could hear anything about it. And from the Dutch
they did hear i t ; for, in anticipation of the American movements, instructions
were sent by the Netherlands to their governor general in Batavia to
write to Japan and invite negotiation about the means that should be adopted
“ to preserve Japan from thq dangers that threatened her.” The Dutch,
therefore, told the Japanese to look for danger from our visit.