never dare to hazard his Ihips, for fear that in fo great a depth of
water their anchors could not hold them.
And let it not be imagined, that I am proceeding upon ground-
lefs and extravagant prefumptions, when I conclude that fifteen
hundred or a thoufand of our people, well conducted, Ihould have
been an over-match for any numbers the Spaniards could mufter
in South America. Since, not to mention the experience we had c.f
them at Paita and Pet apian, it muft be remembered, that our Commodore
was extremely felicitous to have all his men trained to the
dexterous ufe of their fire-arms ; whereas the Spaniards, in this part
o f the world, were wretchedly provided with arms, and were very
aukwardin the management of the few they had ; and though,-on
their repeated reprefentations, the Court of Spain had ordered lèverai
thoufand firelocks to be put on board Pizarrds fquadron, yet
thofe, it is evident, could not have been in America time enough to
have been employed againft us. Hence then by our arms, and our
readinefs in the ufe of them (not to infill on the timidity and foft-
nefs o f our enemy) we Ihould in feme degree have had the fame advantages
which the Spaniards themfelves had, on their firll difco-
very of this country, againft its naked and unarmed inhabitants.
Now let it in the next place be confidered what were the events
which we had to fear, or what were the circutaftances which could
have prevented us from giving law to all the cOaft of South America,
and thereby cutting off from Spain the refourcês which the drew
from thofe immenfe provinces. By fea there was no force capable
of oppofing us ; for how foon foever we had failed, Pizarro’s:fqua-
dron could not have failed fooner that it did, and therefore could
not have avoided the fate it met with. As we Ihould have been
mailers of the ports of Chili, we could there have f t pplied our-
felves with the provifions we wanted in the greateft plenty ; and
from Baldivia to the equinodlial we ran no rifque of lofing Our men
by ficknefs, (that being of all climates the mod temperate and
healthy) nor o f having our Ihips difabled by bad weather. And had
we wanted failors to aflift in the navigating our fquadron, w-hilft a
3 ' confiderable
confiderable proportion of our men were employed on Ihore, we
could not have failed of getting whatever numbers we pleafed in
the ports we Ihould have taken, and from the prizes which would
have fallen into our hands. For I muft obferve that the Indians,
who are the principal mariners in that part of the world, are extremely
docile and dexterous; and though they are not fit to
ftruggle with the inclemencies o f a cold climate, yet in tempeiate
feas they are moll ufeful and laborious feamen.
Thus it then appears, what important revolutions might have
been brought about by our fquadron, had it departed from England
as early as it ought to have done : And from hence it is. eafy to
conclude, what immenfe advantages might have thence accrued to
the Public. For, as on our fuccefs it would have been impoffible
that the kingdom of Spain Ihould have received any treafure from
the provinces bordering on the South-Seas, os Ihould even have had
any communication with them; it is certain that the whole attention
of that Monarchy would have been immediately employed in
endeavouring to regain thefe ineftimable territories, either by force
o f arms or comped. By the firft of thefe methods .it was fcarcely
poffible they could fucceed; for it muft have been at lead a
twelvemonth after our arrival before any Ihips from Spain could
have got into the South-Seas, and when they had been there, they
would have found themfelves without refource : Since they would
probably have been feparated, difabled, and fickly ; and would
then have had no port remaining in their poffeffion, where they
could either rendezvous or refit; whilft we might have been fup-
plied acrofs the Ifthmus with whatever neceffari.es, ftores, or even
men we wanted; and might thereby have fupported our fquadron
in as good a plight, as when it firft fet fail from St. Helens. In
Ihort, it required but little prudence To to have conduced this bu-
finefs, as to have rendered all the efforts of Spain, feconded by the
power of France, ineffeaual, and to have maintained our conquefts
in defiance of them both. Whence they muft either have refolved
to have left Great-Britain miftrefs of the wealth of South America,
P p ' (th-e