appointed, but no representative of British interests,
political or commercial, was to be posted at Lhasa. As
a guarantee for the payment of the indemnity the
Chumbi Valley was to be occupied by the British. The
suzerainty of the Chinese was frankly recognised throughout
the document, and it need hardly be said that
Russia was not referred to. Colonel Younghusband had
frankly expressed his opinion that it would be cheaper
and more effectual in the long run to have a Resident
in Lhasa, and if the Government had not committed
themselves to an opposite policy by their promises to
Russia it is possible that this suggestion, which, to
some extent commended itself to Lord Curzon also,
might have been adopted. We shall see later the actual
course of negotiations and the form which this treaty
eventually assumed. For the moment it is only
necessary to remember that Lord Curzon’s absence from
India on leave from the end of April to the beginning
of December, placed him somewhat at a disadvantage.
He has, however, in the fullest manner, acknowledged
his indebtedness to Lord Ampthill, Governor of Madras
and acting Viceroy of ¡India during Lord Curzon’s
furlough, for the steady way in which the policy, which
had been begun and shaped by himself, was consistently
pressed forward by his successor. The latter, who
was thus in office during the actual advance to Lhasa
and the signing of the treaty, is a man of capacity far
beyond his years. Difficult as his position was— and
the difficulty was added to by the ultimate uncertainty
prevailing as to the length of his tenure of office *— it
* Lord Curzon’s return to India was indefinitely delayed owing to Lady Curzon’s
sudden illness. She had been ailing for some time. On the 21st of September she de-
veloped peritonitis of an aggravated and complicated kind. For three weeks she lay in
Walmer Castle between life and death, and few indeed of those who watched the struggle
LO RD CU RZON ’S PO L IC Y 21
was universally recognised that he had dealt with a new
and increasingly difficult situation with firmness and
restraint, and the Home Government regarded themselves
as under a deep obligation to him.
One advantage of the sending of the expedition
has been, as Lord Curzon is probably very well aware,
that public attention has now been definitely drawn to
a matter which had been allowed to be shelved almost
too long. However much some ¡of the less responsible
members of the Opposition in England may regret it,
it cannot again seriously be contended by them that
our position on the northern ", frontier of India was
this time safe. I have referred to the warnings that
reached Lord Curzon of the gradual insinuation of
Russian influence at Lhasa, and the expedition proved
conclusively that those rumours considerably underestimated
the importance of the" occasion. There is no
reason in the world why Russia should not obtain a
predominating influence in Lhasa except the plain one
that it is incompatible with our own clearly recognised
interests. If such a consideration is held not to have
justified the sending of the Mission, there is little more
to be said, but to those who recognise the importance
of safeguarding our Indian frontiers without possibility
of mistake, a few more considerations as to the policy
to be observed in the future with regard to Tibet may
here be offered.
. To begin with, we have discovered for the first time
the true nature of southern Tibet. It is far from reday
by day had any hopes that she could ultimately throw joff the disease. How-
•ever, to the sincere relief of everyone who [had at heart che best interests o^
India, Lord Curzon, on the 24th of November, was able to leave her to continue her
•convalescence at Highcliffe, and returned to take up the threads of his work at
•Calcutta.