to Dorjieff, bringing with him a large sum of money.
Moreover, the new Amban, whatever his moral deficiencies,
had at least some energy at first. He tried
to carry things with a high hand, and one of his first
actions was severely to censure the inaction of a Chinese
representative, who had been ordered south to confer
with Younghusband ; he seems also to have given our
Kamba jong acquaintance, Ho, a bad quarter of an
hour on the ground that he had misappropriated Government
money. A week after his arrival he made an
official visit to the Dalai Lama, and for three hours
attempted to bring him to reason ; it was not, however,
of much use, and on his return to the Residency the
Amban set himself to the re-organisation and reform of
the military arrangements in Tibet so far as the Chinese
soldiery was concerned. On one point at least he
failed as completely as his predecessor ; he, too, first
requested and finally demanded that he should be
allowed transport to go to Tuna to meet Younghusband,
or Yun-hai-phun, as they transliterated the name.
This th e ' Dalai Lama courteously but firmly refused.
At a subsequent visit the Amban seems to have
moderated his tone, but to no effec t; the Dalai Lama
again cheerfully accepted the responsibility for every
obstacle that was placed in the way of the Amban’s
intended journey, and refused to permit the strengthening
of the Chinese garrisons at the frontier and
in Lhasa. The mood of the Tibetans at this period
was anything but conciliatory. The Tongsa Penlop,
who had written offering his services as mediator
once again, was told that only after a retreat to Ya-
tung and payment of damages for our trespass at Phari
would the question of negotiation be opened.
But the display of temper was not confined to
officials. About this time levies from the province of
Kams were called up, but they refused to come, alleging
that no proper rations had been served out to them; a
promise of proper supplies (which, by the way, was
never performed) induced them to send about a thousand
men for the defence of Lhasa, but in other parts
of the country the demands of the Dalai Lama were
met with a blank refusal. Upon the top of this came
the news of the disaster at Guru and of our occupation
of Gyantse jong. The discontent redoubled. Dorjieff
felt that, now or never, the time was come for action
if he wished to save his life. He seems to have argued
to himself that if a successful attack could be made
upon the small British garrison at Chang-lo, time
would be gained and his policy justified, for the moment
at least. On the other hand, if such an attack were
unsuccessful his own liberty and even his own life would
be in danger; he therefore planned and ordered the
attack on the Mission post on May 5th, and straightway
fled the country, posting north along the Sining highway,
and ultimately branching off along the Urga
road.*
About this time the Tsarong Dépen asked that
troops should be sent to Nagartse to oppose the advance
of the British troops. He especially objected,
it is said, to the English habit of taking photographs.
The Paro Penlop in Bhutan was stealthily approached
by the Dalai Lama at the same time with the object of
inducing the Bhutanese, in the absence of the Tongsa
* Rumours of a subsequent meeting between himself and the Dalai Lama have as yet
no confirmation, but it is not improbable that at Urga or some similar place the two
men have since met.
VOL. II. 2