Others are of opinion, that a moderate force of infantry- and
artillery, landed at Three Anchor Bay, might eafily fucceed in
getting poffeffion of Amfterdam battery in the rear, as well as
the Chavonne and Rogge Bay batteries, after which the caftle
w o u ld no longer be tenable, and the town would be at the
mercy of the attacking party. Perhaps the ftrongeft impreffion
m i g h t b e made b y combining, the two opinions; though a large
force might p r o b a b l y prefer landing on the eaftern beach of
Table Bay, w h e r e there is nothing to interrupt them, crofs the
Salt River, and carry the lines by a Coup de Main, after which,
as I have before obferved, the caffle muft immediately fall, and
die garrifon furrender at difcretion.
The Dutch garrifon, at the evacuation of the colony by the
Engltih, in March laft, were certainly not capable of oppofing
any very confiderable refiftance, or to defend the place againft
a fpirited attack, conduced by an officer of ikill and local, experience.
Three or four ffiips of the line, with four thoufand
men, would he fully fufficient to carry their point ^provided
the Dutch ihould receive no reinforcements from the French,
which, hitherto, there are no grounds for fuppofing to be the
cafe. The whole garrifon, when complete, was intended to
eonfift of three.thoufand men; of thefe were already arrived,
at that time, barely two thoufand, confifting in a regiment of
the Prince of Waldec, about fix hundred ftrong; three hundred
cavalry; three hundred artillery; two or three companies of
grenadiers, and the reft jagers or a light rifle corps, totally un-
difciplined, and corapofed of almoft every nation on the face of
the earth, being, for the moft part, deferters from the German'
regiments.
regiments. And, with regard to the artillery, they were fo
miferably defe&ive that, out of the whole corps, they could
not feleft a fufficient number of trained men to fire the falutes
intended to be made on hoifting the Dutch flag on the firft of
January; but made application to the commanding officer of the
Britiih artillery, for a party to affift them : yet, when the orders
/or the furrender of the-colony were countermanded, and it became
a probable event that hoftilities would enfue, it was induf-
triouily circulated by the.Dutch officers, or rather by the French
officers nominally in the Dutch fervice, that their corps of artillery
was in the higheft ftate of difcipline and order, the greateft
part of the men having diftinguiihed themfelves at the battle
of Marengo ! They were commanded, however, as well as the
cavalry, by a Clive and intelligent officers.
The fervices of the Burgher Cavalry are not likely ever to be
again demanded. Were they, indeed, ever fo well diipofed to
fight, the number-that it would be found practicable to raife
is far from being great. Thole who dwell in the interior parts
of the fettlement would find it extremely inconvenient to quit
their homes, on account of their .Haves and Hottentots, who
might be induced to take advantage of their abfence ; and the
Cape diftridl, containing only about fix thoufand fouls, could
not be fuppofed to furniffi more than a thoufand men fit to
bear arms, and, probably, not one hundred that would dare to
ufe them.
The Hottentot corps, confifting of about five hundred men,
fo far from feeling any difpofition to enter into the fervice of the
VOL. I I . F F Dutch,