of hatatdiag much by faying that it admits not of a
With that of India and China, though, perhaps, too valuable t
be altogether relinquiffied.' In this refpeft the value of Malta
u « A m * - i»“ «<• G° o i * i z '
But the feiofid point is of a more ferious nature. _ Some how-
ever, are of Opinion, that although the fubjugatton of Egypt
may,.at any time be accomplice! by the French, through Malta,
yet, in fuch an event, we have every reafon to expcd that the
vigilance and aftmty of a Britiih fleet, and the valour of Bn-
m foldiers, would always enable us to difpute with them the
paffage of Syria. That, admitting even they Could fficceed in
S l e S n g at Suez an army equalto their wilhes, the difficulties
of tranfportingthis army to India , would be almoft mfurmount-
able If it be meant by thofe who fupport this opinion that
the attempt is to be made by fea, whilft the Cape remained in
our poffeffion, I have little hefitation in agreeing with them
that it would certainly fail. During the laft war, when their
troops had marched to Suez, they had not a Angle Cip in the
Red Sea that dared to carry the French flag, nor, with the Cape
and Ceylon in our hands, could they at any future period have
a fleet of any defcriptibn without our permiffion.
But we will even allow them to have affembled at Suez a
fleet of their own Cips, or of the country coafters efficient to
•take on board their armament deftined for the Malabar coaft.
The nextqueftion is, where, or in what manner, are they to
vidual and to provifion fuch a fleet for a month or five weeks
pafiage, and efpecially in the fupply of the mdifpenfable artic e
o f water ? The fountains of Moles, it is true,. furmC a fupply
of water at allfeafons of the year, but they are fituated at twelve
miles diftancefrom Suez. Water may be, likewife, and is,-col-.
leded in tanks or refervoirs near the town, but it foon grows
fetid. The difficulty, however, of victualling and watering
fuch a fleet, though great, is not infurmountable, and therefore-
may be allowed to be got over.
The dangerous navigation of the Red Sea, in which it appears
not fewer than fifteen armed ffiips were loft between the
time of the French entering Egypt, and the figning of the definitive
treaty of peace, is the next pbftacle that prefents itfelf,
and which may alfo be furmounted. But as the navigation
down this fea can only be performed fix months in the year, oq
account of the periodical winds which there prevail, we can
always know, within fix months, when fuch a fleet would at-,
tempt to pafs the narrow ftrait of Babelmandel, and be prepared
accordingly. This ftrait is completely commanded by the ifland
of Perim, againft which there is no ojher objedion but the
want of water. If, however, we have allowed the French to
furmount fo many difficulties before they can arrive at the
ftrait of Babelmandel, we may furely give ourfelves the credit
of being able to overcome this fingle objection againft the ifland
of Perim. A refervoir to colle£t and preferve rain water might
be conftruaed; or, by digging below the level of the fea, freffi
water would, in all probability, be obtained; or, at any rate,
water might be tranfported thither fromthe continent, fufficient
for the fupply of the fmall garrifon that would be neceflary to
protea the ftrait. The poffeffion of this ifland, with a few frigates,
is faid to be competent for the deftruaion of all the craft
VOL. i i . c c that