the internal commerce of Hindoflan— the opportunity it would
afford of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas,^ whom he
confiders as a warlike and faithful people— the eafy intercourfe
that might be maintained from this coaft with the Perfian gulph,
the Red Sea, the Ifles of France and Bourbon, Madagafcar, and
the Cape of Good Hope.
Thefe are certainly important confiderations, and demand all
the vigilance and attention of our Government in India, Even
a fmall force of French troops, had they been thrown upon the
coaft of Malabar, at the very moment when our forces were
drawn off into the Myfore, againft the Sultaun’s army, might
have proved fatal to our poffeffions on this coaft. The ufurper
would, no doubt, have obtained his reinforcement from the Ifle
of France, and probably without our knowledge, rendering, by
their means, the conqueft of Seringapatam doubtful. If, in fuch
aftate of things, the French forces could have gained a footing
at Bombay, Goa, or Guzzarat, and intrigued themfelves into
an alliance with the Mahratta powers, though it might not have
realized their project of an Indian empire, it would, at leaft,
have been deftru&ive of our poffeffions in the weft of the pe-
ninfula, to hold which, indeed, Mr. Anquetil confiders as fatal
to our power in India.
On this fubjeil his opinion is not Angular; before the overthrow
of the Myfore kingdom, there were many of our own
countrymen, whofe fentiments in this refpeft accorded with
his; and who, like himielf, have not only a profound knowledge
of Indian politics, but are well acquainted with the phyj
ficai
fical and moral charader of the natives, their feveral connections
and relations ; and who, at the fame time, pofiefs the advantage
that local information fo eminently affords.
Thefe gentlemen were then fully perfuaded, that if the native
powers of India could once totally get rid of Europeans, they never
would again admit them as inmates, if they could poffibly avoid
it; and that if we fairly relinquiihed the Malabar and Coromandel
coafts, it would not be difficult to keep others out of
them for ever.- It might fairly be a iked, indeed, if. our prefent
poffeffions there anfwer to us the advantages expeded from
them ? Do they produce a furplus revenue, either in money or
merchandize, over and above their immediate occafions and
expences, to fay nothing of the extraordinary charges they are
expofed to from infurredion or invafion ? Have they not re-
abforbed, not only all their own refources, but drained Bengal
of immenfe fupplies to preferve them from periihing ? Have
we, or can we exped to find, interior refources there to depend
on, without having recourfe to Bengal for fupport ? If we have
not, and the India budget convinces us that we have not, would
it be unwife to take early meafures for converting our prefent
hollow truce with^the native powers of Southern India into a
lolid alliance with them, and (by the ceffion of what we can
never hold at all without jealoufy and envy, and never can hold
long without conteft,) for a valuable confideration, which, no
doubt, might be had, cut away every inch of ground there,
which the French might hope to ftand upon. In fuch eafe the
poffeffion of the Cape or Ceylon would then be of left moment
to us, our Indian force would be concentrated .and invulnerable