iii the provinces of Bengal, which, with China, afford an ample
revenue, and a beneficial commerce, that no enemy is likely to
deprive us of for a long period of time. But thefe Speculations
would all have vanifhed' into air, had we retained the Cape at a
peace, the poffeffion of which, from its pofition on thè globe,
would contribute greatly to fecure our territories in Southern
India, the-danger to which is otherwife fo much to be apprehended.
The conqueft of Myfore has certainly contributed in
no fmall degree to our fecurity on the Malabar coaft ; has con-
folidated our power in 'Southern India; and rendered the junction
of foreign forces with the Mahratta powers more difficult
if not altogether impra&icable. On the northern parts of .this
coaft only are we vulnerable in India by fea.
- Suppofing, however, the views of the enemy, on the Malabar
coaft, to have failed, they would, at leaft, have been enabled,
with the affiftance of the Dutch; to annoy and cut up pur
Indian and China trade by the multitude-of cruizing vefisls fent
out from their iflands of France and Bourbon, and from the
Cape of Good Hope. Even under every difadvantage, the
French frigates and the neft of privateers on the Mauritius fta-
tion did much mifchiefat the commencement of the late war,
and although they had few reinforcements from France, it required
five years, with a very a ¿live and powerful iquadron
from the Cape and from India, before they were all taken and
deftroyed. What then muft have been the cafe, if, inftead of
the Engliffi poffeffing this important ftation, it had been an
enemy’s port for affembling, refitting; and refreihing the combined
fleets of the French and Dutch ? It is unneceffary to obferve,
ferve, that neither of thefe powers would have found much
difficulty in reaching the Cape with Angle ffiips, when we have
an inftance of a whole fleet of Dutch ffiips arriving there not-
withftanding they were fifteen weeks on their paffage. This
fingle fleet, ailing from the Cape, might have been productive
of much inconvenience, expence, and injury to England, and
efpecially to the trade of the Eaft India Company. Were, indeed,
the Frehch and Dutch to keep up a proper naval force at
this place, it is extremely doubtful if any of the homeward-
bound fleets o f the Eaft India Company would ever reach England,
or-if they did, it would be under an expence of convoy
fo enormous, that the profits on the cargoes would be inadequate
to meet i t ; but of this we fhall have occafion to fpeak
more particularly in the next chapter. Such are the dangers
to be apprehended in confequence of the Cape being held by an
enemy.
The principal difadvantages that would refult to England by
leaving Malta in the poffeffion of France appear to be, in the
firft place, the power it would give them of excluding bur Ihips
from that port, the beft, undoubtedly, in the Mediterranean,
and of increafing their force there to the complete deftruQdon of
our Mediterranean trade; and fecondly, the means it would
afford of facilitating their views upon Egypt, by enabling them
to throw into that country a force fufficient to renew their project
upon India.
With regard to the extent and importance of the Mediterranean
trade I fpeak with diffidence, but I am not apprehenfive
of