had encroached upon our territory in Sikkim, they
had established a customs post at Giao-gong, fifteen
miles inside the frontier, and had forbidden British
subjects to pass their outposts there ; they had thrown
down the boundary pillars which had been set up along
the undisputed water-shed between the Tista and the
Ammo chu. They had insulted the treaty rights of the
British by building a wall across the only road from
Tibet to the market of Yatung, which had been thrown
open to trade with India by the stipulations of the
Convention of 1890—3 ; more than this, they returned
unopened letters sent by the Viceroy to the Grand
Lama in Lhasa. These insults would never have given
rise to the despatch of an expedition if the Tibetans
had not added injury to them by their dalliance
with Russia. As it was, there was nothing else to do
but intervene, and that speedily. With characteristic
decision Lord Curzon made up his mind to come to an
understanding with these turbulent children, and in the
spring of 1903 he sent hastily for Major Bretherton and
asked him to present a scheme for the immediate
advance to Lhasa of 1,200 rifles. But this was
found to be impracticable, and the home authorities
were as yet far from understanding the urgency of
the matter.
It is not unjust to say that from first to last the
home Government had mistaken the real importance
of the issue. The utmost that Lord Curzon could
persuade them to do was to sanction the despatch
of Colonel Younghusband, with a small escort, to await
the Tibetan representatives in the little post of Kamba-
j ong, some fifteen miles north of the true Sikkim frontier.
This the Government consented to do, but they added