Haneefa, becaufe a defire o f one divorce only is effentially different
from a defire o f three, this being analogous to a cafe o f execution as
before mentioned,, that is to fay, as the execution. of three divorces in
that inflance was demonfirated to be a fenfible contradiction to that
o f one-, fb, in the prefent inftance, a wifh for three is contradictory to
a wifh for one ;: and, from the woman pronouncing upon herfelf three
divorces, it appears that {he was not defirous of one; and hence the
condition is not fulfilled.— The two difciples fay that one divorce takes
place on this occafion, becaufe a defire for one divorce is comprehended
in a defire for three, on the fame principle as the execution of three
divorces comprehends that of one, (agreeably to their doCtrine before
mentioned ;) and hence the condition is virtually fulfilled.
and & alfo, I f a m a n m a k e a d e le g a t io n o f d iv o r c e to his- w i f e , b y f a y in 0- to
by her fui- , , , , . J t -, °
pending her sre divorced' i f you be defirous of it,’ * and (lie reply “ I
«fhèrhuf-*121 ” am defirous, i f you defire it,”' and he reply, in return, “ I am de-
kand. “ firous,’ - (intending divorce,) the delegation is void, becaufe the
hufband has fufpended the divorce upon the will of the woman where
that is unreftriCted, that is to fay, independant of any thing elfe ; but,
from the converfation, it appears that fhe fulpends her will upon that
of her hufband, and hence the condition of divorce, namely, the indépendant
will of the woman, is not fulfilled;’ thus fhe does not aft
from option ; and the delegation is void of courfe.— The words o f the
hufband, in the laft reply, namely,'“ I am defirous,” are not effective
of divorce, although fuch be his intentidn, becaufe there is no mention
whatever of divorce in the words of the woman, from which the-
hufband’s wifh to that effeCt might be inferred in his an-fwer, and1
the intention alone does not fuffice, as it has no operation with refpeft
to a thing not mentioned ; whereas, if he were to fay, “ I am-defirous
r fy our divorce, it takes place if he. fo intend it, becaufè he in this
cafe appears to give divorce de novo, as a defire expreffed with relpeCt
to any thing implies the exiftence of that thing, and hence his expref-
fion “ I uni dejirous of your divorce,” is as if he were to fay “ I*
ca iife
“ caufe your divorce,” which accordingly takes place: contrary to
what would follow, if he were to fay *“ I intend your divorce,” in
which cafe divorce would not take place, becaufe an intention expreffed
does not imply the exiftence of the thing intended.— If, moreover,
in the cafe now recited, the woman were to reply “ I am de-
“ firous i f my father be fo,” or “ if fuch a circumftance happen,”
(meaning a circumftance which does not yet exift,) and the father
afterwards fignify his defire, or the circumftance upon, which fhe has
fufpended the divorce come to pafs, yet divorce does not take place,
and the delegation is void:— but i f fhe, in faying. “ i f fuch a thing
“ happen,” mean a thing which has already- paffed, divorce takes
place, becaufe fufpenfion upon a condition already fulfilled amounts to.
immediate or unfufpended divorce.
I f a man fay to his wife “ you are divorced when you pleafe,”
or “ whenever you pleafe,” and fhe reject his offer, faying “ I am
“ not defirous of it,” her rejection is not final, for here the power
veiled in her is not confined to the place or fituation where it is delegated,
on which account fhe is at liberty to ufe it either there or
elfewhere, becaufe the terms when and whenever are ufed with reference
to all times, and extend to every time indifcriminately, and
hence the fenfe of the expreffions “ when you pleafe,” and “ * when«-
“ ever you pleafe,” is “ at whatever time you pleafe,” and they are;
therefore, not confined to place. And-if the woman rejedt at'prefent,
ftill it ;ii| not a final rejection, becaufe her hufband has empowered her
to divorce herfelf at whatever time fhe- pleafes, wherefore the power
does not apply to the time when fhe- does not pleafe.— But it is to be
obferved that the woman is not in this cafe authorized* to pronounce
upon herfelf more than one divorce, becaufe the words when and whenever
apply to all times, but not to more than a fingle divorce; thus fhe
is authorized to divorce herfelf at whatever time fhe pleafes, but not to«
pronounce divorce as often as fhe pleafes.
When the"
power is expreffed
with
an unreftridl-
ed particle,
(in refpeft to
time,)*it is
perpetual,
extending tor
all times and
places:
I f