with “ pacíficos ” who did not support him, while
those “ concentrated ” out of his reach were dying
of disease and starvation. He was succeeded by
General Rodriguez, but the only result of the operations
in the west in the spring of 1897 was to destroy
property, paralyse industry and trade, and aggravate
the terrible distress which was almost universal.
There was the usual lull in the summer, but the
horrors of the Weyler campaign of slaughter and
destruction and the suffering and wholesale death of
the wretched “ reconcentrados ” were producing a
profound impression in the United States. In
August, Cánovas del Castillo, the Prime Minister
of Spain, who had sent General Wey ler out to succeed
Campos, and who insisted upon the policy of
forcing submission before considering measures of
conciliation and reform, was assassinated, and was
succeeded by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, who proceeded
to reverse that policy and to propose measures
of conciliation and reform as a means of bringing
the insurrection to an end. T o carry out the new
policy, General Ramon Blanco was sent to supersede
Weyler as governor-general, and the latter returned
at once to Spain to join in the opposition to a proffered
scheme of autonomy for Cuba.
Hostilities were virtually in suspense, save for
some spasmodic movements here and there, and on
the arrival of Blanco, in November, 1897, he proceeded
with his new policy of pacification. Partly
in response to remonstrances from the United States
Government, the orders of reconcentration were revoked,
and measures of relief for the suffering and
starving “ pacíficos ” were taken or permitted, for
they were little better off in their devastated homes
than in the guarded towns. The insurgent forces
were scattered, exhausted, and disheartened, and
the Spanish army was demoralised. A scheme of
autonomy, which had not y e t been approved by the
Spanish Cortes, and whose chief feature was the
creation of an insular parliament with restricted
powers, was laboriously put into effect, though
utterly repudiated by all sympathisers with the rebellion,
and disliked by most of the resident Spaniards.
It had the support of a small autonomist
party, chiefly in Havana; and by most others was
regarded either as visionary and impracticable, or as
a delusion and a snare. In the United States there
was little confidence in its being accepted by the
Cubans or continued in good faith by the Spanish
Government.
T he Cuban 1 Constitution ” of 1895 had provided
for a new Constituent assembly, to meet in October,
1897, and an electoral law was passed by the “ A d ministrative
Council ” for the selection of delegates
from the six provinces. Under this, twenty-four
representatives were elected by the “ citizens of the
republic,” including those who were serving as
soldiers in the field, and the sessions of the A s sembly
were held in October and November, 1897.
A new constitution was adopted, to be in force two
years unless independence was sooner achieved, and
new officers of government were chosen. Bartolomé
Masso was made president, and Domingo Mendez
Capote vice-president, and heads of departments