be collected upon one point, except at Colombo,’ where by far
the larger proportion of. the military establishment was usually
stationed. This place had also, been greatly strengthened by
tlie Swiss regiment of De Meuron ; but unfortunately for the
Dutch the term of it& services expired at the critical season
of danger; and by an rmaccpimtablfr overnight' in policy; this
fine body o f troops was permitted, on greater ad vantage?.-, being
held out to. them, to transfer their services to their most dari-f
gerous enemies, and to co-operate powerfully in,the reduction *
of their former masters.
T his military establishment of the Dutch, which rarely exceeded
five thousand men in; alk/was. found sufficient, to repel
the attacks o f the native Princes. I t was also capable,; : from the
nature of the country, oi completely baffling therattempts'of
any European foree . that did not much exceed in-number- the
troops stationed at any particular point. But. .it ¥is> .evident, from
the «reat extent o f the island, that th is small force- was- obliged
to be too scattered, to be capable of making anyviefiectual resistance
a^iinst a numerous-enemy. When the-depthfjofi water on
the eastern shore is considered," as well/as the facility afituided
for landing by the spacious harbour ..of .Triiicomalee, it is‘ impossible
that a sufficient number of troops for the?de&nce of; this
quarter could have been spared from, the-protection ofothfr rich
countries, j on • the south-west, which were ^menaeed - by an, enemy
ready to make a descent. from the coast immediately opposite;-
The difficulty of communication likewise requires the force employed
to be the greater, as it is next to impossible! to march
troops from one side of the island to the other, - in tim estq
render each other any effectual support.
But it is not the defence of the island itself alone that
should' indticenus always to maintain a powerful force here.
From its .situation, it r affords/the; best point For* stationing those
tÿoops -which are destfoedbto protect ©Ur j several establishments
in Indian and to ,a c t as a constant - check on the native princes,
On the/Coromandel coast in particular, where our possessions
hayetiof lateiShèfem so much-extended, tfùops may ffr-'
rivé, from Ceylon in r a day ©r-twO, arid by^ tfrisd means pre-
vçlMde the possibility, of • our/settlements being overrun'by/surprise.
before-;-a, sufficient fonce could the ^olleGtedqEa voppose the
ifivader. During the disturbances ^which: arose o n /th e borders
of Tinivelly- .and Madura, my attention was forcibly calledr !to
this subject->b,y th e events which t took- -places.there. Owing to
the „small number^ of "troops stationed at th a t. tithe- in !<?eylen,
it' was found impossible to co-operate fromt-thtàice with those
Sent by thê :company tfr depress; the commotions ; arid before a
sufficientyforceicouid be brought' together from othdt ‘quartets
for’ this < purpose, several; .officers and a great n um fe :- of soldiers
were'killed and wounded, i Had a large force been a t that
period stationed in Ceylon, the disturbance might have been
almost immediately quelled.
.Troops may-be s e n t'to any of our-possessions in the peninsula
o f / India - ; front Geÿloiï at a; less, expence, and in much
shpriter Times, than from eifchsr ? pj^idenoies of Bombay
of Mashas.- /Since we. have been in possession of ■ the island,,
detachments havefat various. times |bêbri sent with gréât effect
tri jo te th e troops serving against the Foligars and the Nairs
in the Cotiote.
I t is impossible to estimate the establishments intended to
be placed in Ceylon by government, from their situation when
I left the island, as at that time it had not been ceded by
3 b 2